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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 25 July 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Stephen J. Ledogar (United States of America)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 599th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I would note the departure, during the recent recess, of the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Baljinnyam, to whom I wish, on behalf of all of us, all the best in her future activities.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Peru, Sweden, Finland, Romania and Canada. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): It is a pleasure for me to see you, Ambassador Ledoqar, an outstanding representative of the United States of America, presiding over the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The United States and Peru have always cultivated lasting links of friendship and cooperation, which have now been reinforced by a common effort to strengthen democracy in the Americas, to fight drug trafficking and the spread of weapons. What a happy coincidence that this very morning under your presidency it should fall to me to take the floor to inform this unique multilateral negotiating body that the Government of Peru has invited the Latin American countries in the Rio Group to attend a special meeting of their Foreign Ministers in Lima next November, in order to agree for the first time in our region on measures of arms limitation, strengthening of security and transparency among Latin American democracies. This Peruvian initiative falls within the context of the historical breakthrough which has occurred recently in the world and which has led to the end of the cold war and the establishment of a promising international climate founded on stability and international cooperation.

In the area of security and arms limitation this process of mutual trust and understanding led first to the Washington Treaty, whereby two categories of intermediate and short-range nuclear missiles were limited, and later to the United States-Soviet agreement on the non-production and destruction of the bulk of their respective chemical-weapon arsenals; the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe; and the imminent signature of the first START agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning cuts in a substantial number of strategic weapons. In addition, a few weeks ago President Bush proposed a peace plan for the Middle East which was followed by the arms control and disarmament plan proposed by President Mitterrand and the endorsement by the Group of Seven of Prime Minister Major's initiative, supported by Japan, for the establishment of a register of arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations.

In short, the impressive changes which have occurred in East-West relations have been accompanied by a series of important steps in the area of security and arms limitation. In this context Latin America could not be an exception, nor could it stand aside. That is why, at the summit of heads of State and government of the Ibero-American countries held in Guadalajara, Mexico, the President of Peru, Alberto Fujimori, proposed Latin American

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disarmament with the objective of using the resources thus released to promote economic and social development in the region. This initiative forms part of a new concept of national defence designed to maintain the stability of democratic and legitimately constituted Governments in the face of the internal threats of underdevelopment, drug trafficking and terrorism, external debt and critical poverty in Latin America.

Consequently, I am pleased to inform the Conference on Disarmament that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru has communicated to the ambassadors in Lima of the member countries of the Rio Group - Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela - a proposal for the holding in Lima next November, on dates to be decided, of a special meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Rio Group, firstly, to agree expressly on a joint renunciation of all types of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and secondly, to reach agreement on banning the acquisition, production or transfer in the future of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles for warlike purposes in Latin America, as well as the new generations of advanced systems of conventional weapons - I refer principally to fuel-air bombs with a massive explosive and destructive effect, laser-guided bombs and munitions, long-range extremely destructive multistage rocket systems, anti-radar and "stealth" technology. Also a ban on the introduction of nuclear propulsion in the attack submarines of Latin American countries. The third objective of the Lima meeting would be to devote itself to measures to build security, confidence and transparency among the democracies of the Rio Group, such as intensification of contacts between military high commands, cuts in troops and offensive weapons in border areas, mutual notification of military manoeuvres, invitations to attend them, visits to military facilities and the creation of a centre to register the transfer and production of weapons in our countries.

The Lima meeting will undoubtedly help to strengthen security, development and democracy in Latin America and will, I believe, mark a new era of solidarity and cooperation in the region. The democracies of Latin America, which are the faithful reflection of the hopes of their peoples, cannot stand aside from the process of peace and security which is under way in the world today. The Latin American democracies must base their relations on mutual trust and transparency in their national defence systems. Equally, the Latin American democracies cannot further burden future generations with external debts caused by the acquisition or manufacture of new and costly arms. The democracies in Latin America have first of all to secure the welfare of their peoples and work for constitutional stability and wholehearted respect for international treaties. The Latin American democracies must once and for all say no to arms trafficking, no to wars of aggression, no to suspicion and lack of transparency. Yes to a new order based on the full application of international law. Yes to human rights. In conclusion, yes to life, prosperity and solidarity.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Peru for his most important statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): Let me first congratulate you, Ambassador Ledogar, on assuming the important function of President of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation is confident that our work will continue to be effectively guided through your well-known diplomatic skills. I should also like to thank Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom for her distinguished contribution as the preceding President of the Conference.

World politics have undergone dramatic changes in recent years. As part of this process, there has been a significant evolution in perceptions of nuclear weapons. In January 1985, the Soviet Union and the United States undertook to start negotiations on nuclear and space arms which they had agreed "should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere". In December 1987, they agreed to eliminate all their land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles, to completely abolish one entire category of nuclear missiles. This was not only the first agreement on nuclear arms reductions in history. It also marked a breakthrough for intrusive verification provisions in international disarmament. The destruction of intermediate-range land-based nuclear missiles has now reportedly been completed. Moreover, there is now every indication that we will experience the next breakthrough in nuclear arms reductions. Both Moscow and Washington have publicly declared that they are on the verge of finalizing the START agreement on major cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. This constitutes a diplomatic achievement we have every reason to praise. It is a great victory for disarmament efforts. By all accounts, it will be a militarily much more significant arms reduction agreement than the INF Treaty. However, it must be kept in mind that these reductions will only bring their strategic arsenals back to about the same level as when the negotiations started nine years ago. Let us, nevertheless, make sure that this agreement becomes an injection of vitality in our negotiations here at the Conference on Disarmament.

There have been other essential developments in the recent improvement in the international climate. One significant development concerns the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A number of States - including several countries in southern Africa, among them South Africa - have recently joined the non-proliferation Treaty. France, one of the nuclear-weapon Powers that has not acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, announced its decision in principle to do so. The most fundamental and far-reaching change has centred on Europe, the most heavily armed continent, where the two major military alliances confronted each other for several decades.

A totally new Europe is emerging. A Europe that has left entrenched rivalries behind, that has moved beyond the cold war. One element in the political transformation of Europe has been agreements on comprehensive military confidence-building measures and major reductions of conventional armed forces involving highly intrusive verification provisions. I would like to make reference here also to the declining trend in the total numbers of nuclear-weapon tests. In the Soviet Union, in particular, there has been a

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marked decline in nuclear-weapon tests, in part due to popular opposition for health and environmental reasons to such tests. Also the Nordic countries have to the Government of the Soviet Union expressed their serious concern.

The decline in testing must not, however, obscure the fact that tens of thousands of nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States. We must not overlook the fact that, in spite of the incipient quantitative reductions, the qualitative development of nuclear weapons continues. The real purpose of testing is, no doubt, to develop more effective nuclear weapons. Nor must we forget that, in spite of the improved political climate, the testing of nuclear weapons continues. Furthermore, an end to nuclear testing would be a clear manifestation of a genuine will to pursue nuclear disarmament. It would also be a proof of our commitment to save and protect the environment. An end to testing would clearly demonstrate that we share and respect the worries expressed by millions of people as regards the environmental effects of nuclear testing.

The importance of a comprehensive nuclear test ban has long been widely acknowledged by the international community. For more than 30 years, the total prohibition of testing of nuclear weapons has been considered crucial to halting the nuclear arms race and a way of curbing horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. Year after year, the General Assembly of the United Nations has underscored the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The momentous changes in world politics, the end of the cold war, the actual reductions of nuclear weapons, and the prospects for further significant cuts in the nuclear-weapon arsenals, the breakthrough for intrusive disarmament verification methods, progress in the efforts to halt nuclear-weapon proliferation and the declining trend in nuclear-weapon testing are developments which suggest that the time has come to start negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is against this background that Sweden is today introducing to this Conference a draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The partial test-ban Treaty, which bans nuclear-weapon test explosions, and any other nuclear explosions, in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, has, for obvious reasons, reduced radioactive contamination of the atmosphere. As a disarmament measure, however, it has been of marginal importance since the Treaty does not contain provisions prohibiting underground nuclear explosions.

The Swedish position as to the need for urgent negotiations on a comprehensive test ban has not changed in the last decades. Together with a vast majority of other States, Sweden has consistently worked for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 expresses the commitment to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. This commitment is reaffirmed in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968.

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After close to almost three decades, still no negotiations are being conducted on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. On the contrary, it is even being stated that such a treaty is only a long-term goal.

Fundamentally, the case for ending nuclear testing rests on the need to put an end to a mad security system built on nuclear deterrence. However, there are also widespread concerns about the collateral effects of nuclear testing.

The United Nations study on nuclear weapons, which I had the privilege of chairing, provides an account of medical and environmental effects of nuclear-weapon production and testing. In my judgement, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the nuclear-weapon Powers to justify continued nuclear testing. To the vast majority of States it is not acceptable that year after year goes by without serious efforts to achieve a test ban - indeed, without even starting negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The re-initiation of negotiations on this matter has been urgent for many years. To refuse to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty defies the will of the overwhelming majority of States.

The draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that Sweden is introducing today is a revised and considerably extended version of the draft treaty submitted by Sweden in 1981 (CD/381 of 14 June 1983). The major changes have been undertaken with regard to the protocols of the draft treaty, dealing with a verification system and organizational matters.

In this new draft, we have tried to take into consideration developments during the last few years, above all in the United Nations, in the Conference on Disarmament and at the PTBT Amendment Conference, including protocol II of the proposals for amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty. We have of course also considered new working papers, proposals and contributions from individual countries. We have also taken into account the rapid scientific and technical developments.

Specifically, we recognize and have made an effort to build upon achievements in the realm of disarmament verification in recent years. We have, therefore, redrafted our proposals with regard to the organization which will oversee the overall function of the treaty and its verification arrangements. As envisaged in the new Swedish draft, the principal organ of the organization to oversee compliance with the treaty is the conference of the States parties. The other organs to be established are the executive council and the technical secretariat. In this context, we have not only made use of the terminology in the draft chemical weapons convention. We have also to a certain degree built on the conceptual approach in the negotiations on that forthcoming convention. In this context, we have built furthermore on the verification provisions of the threshold test-ban Treaty.

With regard to verification we have, of course, taken special account of the progress made in the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament. The technical achievements in the field of verification are such that effective international verification of a CTBT is now possible.

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The question of verification is no longer a technical one, but of a political nature. Given political preparedness to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the effectiveness of the verification regime is largely a question of the amount of resources which are allocated for this purpose.

An adequate verification system is a most important element in a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The legitimate right and duty of all States to participate in the verification of international treaties to which they are parties must be recognized. This political recognition must be supported by international technical arrangements that make it possible for all parties to gain access to the results obtained through the verification machinery. International cooperative measures are a cornerstone of the verification arrangements of this draft treaty. Sweden is committed to the work of establishing such international verification arrangements.

In a world where the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is obvious, a comprehensive test-ban treaty must be designed so as to encourage the widest possible adherence. It must, therefore, be non-discriminatory. The rules should be the same for all.

The draft treaty and its three protocols, containing measures such as seismic monitoring, surveillance of airborne radioactivity, satellite observation and on-site inspection, are altogether aimed at establishing a basis for an effective verification system. All in all, I hope that the new draft treaty submitted by Sweden will provide a political and technical basis for intensified work on the CTBT issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

Nuclear testing demonstrates that nuclear-weapon States insist on retaining the option of further developing these weapons of Armageddon. The continuation of nuclear-weapon testing is not in harmony with current trends in world politics. Neither is testing compatible with a concern for the environment and our common future. The ending of nuclear tests would be a major step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The prohibition of nuclear test explosions will also be instrumental in preventing the proliferation of such weapons.

The Conference on Disarmament is the proper forum to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Indeed, it is the very first item on its agenda. We can afford no more procrastination. The recent dramatic improvement in world politics shows every nation that the time has come to negotiate such a treaty. Let us start now.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for her most interesting statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Finland, Dr. Rautio.

Mrs. RAUTIO (Finland): I have asked for the floor to introduce the latest "blue book", which has been circulated as a CD document (CD/1090). Like last year's report, the 1991 "blue book" is a joint report of countries which participated in the second round-robin test. A brief description of the

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test has also been circulated as a working paper (CD/CW/WP.350) by Australia, Canada, China, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Finland, France, Germany, India, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. That working paper was introduced in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons yesterday. In my presentation today, I will mainly deal with the conclusions of the test that are of more general interest than the analytical details as such.

In order that the exercise should follow a likely CWC scenario it was agreed that the samples for the second round-robin test should simulate an inspection of the chemical industry by including appropriate background chemicals. The laboratory that volunteered to prepare the samples chose to use charcoal, Tenax, XAD-2 and cotton buds as sample matrices in addition to aqueous samples. Some of the samples were spiked with octyl methylphosphonofluoridate, which, although a schedule 1 chemical, is not (within public knowledge) a CW agent. This meant that many laboratories did not have the necessary reference material (authentic reference substance or database information) to make a positive identification of the principal spiking substance. In the absence of a readily identifiable CW agent upon which to focus, the participating laboratories applied varying degrees of effort in identifying as many compounds as possible to allow judgement whether they were scheduled compounds.

Accordingly, to maximize the value of this second round-robin test, the objective of the test was changed from analysis of samples for CW agent and their degradation products to their content of any scheduled chemicals.

In the event the laboratories reported 17 scheduled chemicals, 31 other phosphorus-containing chemicals and 89 non-phosphorus chemicals. All laboratories identified the chemicals used as starting materials in the synthesis of the planned end-product, the pesticide dichlorvos. Only two laboratories reported chemicals belonging to schedule 1, the mixture of isomeric octyl methylphosphonofluoridates. All laboratories except one identified dimethyl methylphosphonate, which is a schedule 2 compound and appeared as an impurity of feedstock material. Six laboratories identified the mixture of isomeric dioctyl methylphosphonates which are also schedule 2 compounds and primary degradation products of the principal spiking compound. Three laboratories identified the mixture of methyl octyl methylphosphonates. Two laboratories reported detection of alkyl alkyl methylphosphonates but were not able to identify the actual alkyl groups. In addition to the octyl derivatives, four additional methyl phosphonates and methylphosphonic acid were reported.

All the participating laboratories considered the second round-robin test very useful, even though the original plan of the test did not materialize. The results obtained from the analysis of samples according to the revised objective probably raised many more questions than the original plan would have done.

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The need for background information on samples was discussed by the scientists of the participating laboratories. They considered it desirable to know whether the samples had been collected in an area of alleged use or in an industrial site. The participants also considered the analysis request, be it confirmation of preliminary identifications, identifying scheduled chemicals or structure elucidation of unknown chemicals, to be more important for the off-site laboratories than to know whether the inspection had been a routine or challenge inspection.

In the present test the laboratories were informed that the samples did not contain CW agents. This information caused some confusion, however, because not all laboratories were aware of the difference between a CW agent and a schedule 1 chemical and, accordingly, some did not look for members of the nerve agent families.

Information on the particular sampling points in the facility helped in understanding the production process. However, such information might be considered highly confidential by the facility, the kind of information that should not be revealed to a laboratory capable of doing in-depth analysis of all chemicals in the samples. This type of information is, naturally, available to the inspectors on-site, but this confidential information can be protected by the use of "blinded" instruments, i.e. those having only scheduled and related chemicals in their databases.

As shown by the test, a large number of chemicals can be tentatively identified with a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer (GC/MS), the instrumentation planned for on-site analysis, if reference spectra are available in the computer of the instrument.

The second round-robin test showed that if the analytical request is to identify any scheduled chemicals, the methods should be such as to allow detection of all individual compounds on the schedules. As long as the databases remain incomplete, samples should be monitored by techniques allowing detection of family members. Easily volatile chemicals such as phosgene and hydrogen cyanide require slightly different procedures than those optimized for nerve agents and mustards.

The scientists discussed the criteria and need to report chemicals other than scheduled ones to the future technical secretariat. This question was felt important since the number of chemicals that can be identified in off-site laboratories is greater than during on-site analysis. In this test the laboratories reported non-scheduled feedstock chemicals and the product of ongoing synthesis, plus their impurities and a large number of unrelated chemicals. It was pointed out that the identification of non-scheduled chemicals could be used to identify industrial processes and could corroborate the stated purpose of the process and be used as evidence of compliance. However, this would not necessarily be an indication of compliance all of the time. In the present test, toluene and trichloroacetaldehyde confirmed that during the inspection the facility was producing dichlorvos.

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Some laboratories identified and reported sodium fluoride and octyl alcohols, which do not belong to the schedules either, but which could indicate earlier production of octyl methylphosphonofluoridates.

The need to identify and report non-scheduled chemicals is determined by the goal of the verification, whether it is to confirm the absence of non-declared scheduled chemicals or also to confirm that the current production of the facility is in line with the declaration. If the goal is to confirm the absence of non-declared scheduled compounds, the goal can be achieved on-site with "blinded" instruments. In this case, chemicals such as sodium fluoride and octyl alcohols would remain undetected unless they were included in the database as additional chemicals.

If the goal is to confirm a declaration, on-site analysis would require that the databases for the instruments contain data on the chemical products and their feedstock chemicals instead of data on scheduled chemicals. In this case, in addition to undeclared non-restricted production, undeclared scheduled chemicals would go undetected.

If both current production and the absence of scheduled chemicals are to be verified, the number of chemicals in the databases increases substantially. At present negative assurance seems to be the preferred objective. For the future tests, the group agreed that only scheduled chemicals should be reported.

The present test strongly emphasized the need for identification criteria in verification analyses. Some laboratories did not list any chemicals for which no reference material was available, and the identification of which would have had to be based on structure elucidation only. Some laboratories listed chemicals solely on the basis of electron ionization spectra after comparison of the recorded spectra with those in commercial libraries.

The scientists discussed the degree of certainty required before a scheduled chemical is reported to the technical secretariat as present in the samples collected during an inspection of a chemical facility. The results of on-site and off-site analyses have to be considered separately.

The goal of on-site analysis is to support the verification of compliance with the treaty, i.e. to find out if there are any samples that need to be sent to two off-site laboratories for confirmatory analysis. Unambiguous identification is not required on-site, just an indication that scheduled chemicals might be present. On the other hand, the goal of off-site analysis is to obtain unambiguous confirmation of the analytical results obtained on-site. The scientists discussed whether unambiguous results are the only ones that should be reported by laboratories to the technical secretariat or whether tentative assignments, clearly marked as tentative, should also be released, to allow the secretariat to make the final identification. The group considered it imperative that the laboratories do the final identification themselves and report only those chemicals for which they have an unambiguous identification, i.e. a simple yes/no answer. In cases when the results from the two laboratories differ, the technical secretariat should

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send the samples for final evaluation to a third laboratory together with the analytical data from the two laboratories. The experts from the three laboratories together could then resolve the discrepancies.

The criteria for unambiguous identification were discussed at some length. There was consensus that two independent spectrometric techniques giving identical results are required. If the concentration of the sample is high enough, two different techniques such as mass spectrometry and infrared spectrometry or mass spectrometry and nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometry are to be preferred over two similar techniques, such as two kinds of mass spectrometry.

In all the spectrometric methods, unambiguous identification requires that the analytical results be compared with reference data in a database or with data recorded from an authentic compound using the same individual instrument. The latter procedure involving authentic compounds was considered more reliable because the recorded and database spectra are likely to have been recorded under different conditions.

The present test highlighted the difficulties in identifying chemicals for which there are no earlier data or authentic compounds available. Preliminary identification has to be based on the interpretation of different types of spectra and final confirmation is obtained only after synthesis of the proposed chemical and recording of the identification data for purposes of comparison. In future, such a requirement for synthesis might delay the reporting of analytical results to the technical secretariat and, accordingly, underlines the need for as complete a database as possible at the earliest date after the convention has entered into force.

Unambiguous identification requires that the arrangement of atoms in the molecule be exactly known. The large number of isomeric chemicals in the octyl families made it impossible to determine the exact configuration of the octyl side chain. For purposes of verification, the scientists considered it sufficient to be able to report that octyl methylphosphonofluoridates were identified, without the need to report each of the fluoridates separately. Scientifically speaking this means that identifications were not unambiguous but that they were sufficient for the purpose, especially as the draft convention requires identification of alkyl methylphosphonofluoridates, not the exact structure of the alkyl moiety.

The results of the present test need to be evaluated in terms of success in identifying those samples that would have warranted transport to verification laboratories for more detailed analysis. The most important samples were those containing schedule 1 compounds and those containing methylphosphonates, especially the octyl derivatives. The only schedule 1 chemicals, the mixture of isomeric octyl methylphosphonofluoridates, were reported by only two laboratories, despite the availability of sophisticated in-house equipment. This was partly due to the degradation of the fluoridates during transport of the samples and partly due to the lack of reference data for these compounds. The degradation would of course have been avoided if the analysis had been performed on-site. Both the fluoridates and the

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methylphosphonates have specific ions in their mass spectra, most probably common to almost all members of the respective families, so they too would have been detected on-site.

The scientists considered the recommended operating procedures important for both on-site and off-site analyses and accordingly compiled procedures for the new sample matrices and analytical techniques. The need continuously to improve procedures, to meet the challenges of new developments in the analytical field, raised the idea of a "rolling text" for the recommended operating procedures.

The second round-robin test demonstrated the need to solve the problems associated with the transportation of samples. At present, the laboratory responsible for the preparation of samples is the only one that can give information on the toxicity of the samples with a view to finding the appropriate means of transportation. Rules acceptable for every Government should, therefore, be found for the transportation of test samples in order to facilitate the work of the future convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Finland for a very interesting report on the second round-robin test, which has so many implications for the work of our CW Committee. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): It gives me particular pleasure that, for the first time, as representative of the new, democratic Romania, I address this august and unique United Nations body entrusted with the difficult but important task of negotiating agreements on disarmament.

My privilege is twofold. First, that I'm bringing here the irreversible options of Romania for democracy and market economy at home, for full openness, cooperation based on partnership and transparency in international affairs. Secondly, I'm joining you, distinguished and noted specialists, in your noble efforts for halting the arms race at a time when, due to the radical changes in human experience with respect to the fundamental importance of human rights and freedoms for the whole development of mankind, including security systems, important progress is also being achieved in the field of disarmament. I shall cooperate with you open-mindedly, free of any inhibition, either political or ideological, ready to share with you our concerns and perceptions.

Indeed, we witness profound mutations in the security situation in the world. Let's take only the recent disappearance of the Warsaw Treaty with all its consequences, political and military, and the legitimate concerns of Eastern European countries with respect to their security in the existing vacuum. In a period when we work intensively for building up an all-European cultural area, establishing a common human dimension and expanding economic integration, the necessity also arises to create a common Euro-Atlantic security system. We appreciate very much the opinion expressed by

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Mr. Manfred Wörner, Secretary-General of NATO, during his recent official visit to Bucharest, that Romania's security concerns, like the security concerns of other Eastern European countries, must be taken into consideration in any new arrangements in Europe.

Meantime, we consider that measures should be taken in order to avoid any exacerbation of the tension in some areas of Eastern Europe, including abstention from interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It will be of greatest importance to avoid especially the creation of opposing alliances. This is why Romania, pointing out the profound defensive and stabilizing character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, strongly advocates the undertaking of the obligation by all East European and other countries in Europe to refrain from concluding alliances directed against other countries on the continent.

These evolutions and changes also have a bearing on the methods of work and systems of consultations within our Conference, and we are called upon to address this matter too.

It is undeniable that important progress has been achieved in efforts to halt the arms race, reduce armaments and control the armaments drive, and that new and important agreements can be concluded in the field of disarmament. We highly praise in this respect the contributions of your great country, Mr. President, the United States of America, which open new vistas for our endeavours. With you chairing this Conference, we stand confident that we can succeed in attaining further progress in our work, first of all in putting the final touch on the chemical weapons convention.

The recent initiative of your country, presented personally by President George Bush, is unanimously appreciated as a real breakthrough for the solution of the remaining problems. This has already led to the emergence of a consensus on article I of the "rolling text", providing a more comprehensive character of the prohibition, which is applicable in any circumstances whatsoever.

Among the major remaining issues to be solved, verification is, of course, the most important. We share fully the view that verification is vital for assuring the efficiency of the convention. In such a way, States will be more assured that their security concerns are covered. Romania is ready to submit herself to any verification that meets with the agreement of the other States. Meantime, we understand the tremendous objective difficulties lying before us, and first of all before the experts who deal directly with this problem. Among other things, as has rightly been stressed during the debates, it is necessary to find an equilibrium between the necessity to prevent any violations of the undertaken obligations and the legitimate preoccupation to protect certain installations from improper intrusions that do not have any relation with the objective of the convention. We ourselves have such problems and are interested in balanced and efficient control.

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My country, which is unequivocally committed to the achievement of a total and comprehensive banning of chemical weapons, repeatedly declared in the last year and a half that it possessed no chemical weapons or had the means of producing them, nor the intention to acquire them. The Romanian Government wants to become an original party to the chemical weapons convention.

I am pleased to announce here today that as far as chemical weapons are concerned, and more specifically the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, the Romanian Parliament adopted last month a law on the withdrawal of the reservations made to the text of the Protocol a long time ago. This month, Romania officially notified France, as the depositary country, about the withdrawal of these reservations.

We support the proposal made by our Austrian colleague that countries which still have such reservations should withdraw them collectively and, in order to come to such an arrangement, a special meeting of the concerned countries be convened. We also share the view that this could be done during the envisaged ministerial meeting on chemical weapons.

One cannot appreciate more the efforts deployed by the United States and Soviet Union in order to conclude the INF Treaty permitting for the first time in history a destruction of arms, and these are nuclear delivery vehicles, one of the most destabilizing arms. The whole world and first of all European nations received with great satisfaction the news about the destruction of the last United States and Soviet land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. In the same sense mention should be made about the commitments undertaken by the Soviet Union and United States to unilaterally withdraw significant numbers of tactical nuclear warheads from the European region. Also, the ratification of the threshold test-ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties gave hope that progress will also be obtained in the negotiations on the prohibition of all nuclear tests.

We welcome the imminent signature of the START treaty, which, as Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh appreciated, "is the most striking document ever elaborated in history, not to mention its size. It is a fantastically complex penetration into the heart of strategic balances and technologies".

The negotiated reductions and unilateral measures aimed at gradual elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe made possible significant progress in conventional disarmament on the continent as well. The CFE Treaty signed last year establishes a new military balance at a substantially lower level of armaments. In our view there are good conditions to continue this process and carry out, correctly and completely, the Paris Charter provisions on weapon reduction. A weapon-free Europe is still a utopian dream but a continent with less weapons represents an attainable objective. At the same time, openness and transparency, confidence-building measures in general are proven pace-setters for disarmament measures, as stipulated in the 1990 Vienna Document of the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures and the Paris Charter. Such measures could be envisaged not only in the

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frame of a multilateral document, but on a bilateral basis too. We have in mind the possibility of two neighbour countries to conclude agreements conceived as instruments aimed at increasing confidence and strengthening good-neighbourliness. The agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Hungary on the establishment of an "open skies" regime, signed on 11 May 1991 in Bucharest, stands for an application of this orientation. This agreement sets up an aerial surveillance regime under which unarmed aircraft of both parties are authorized to conduct observation flights above the territory of each other.

The Gulf crisis served to remind us of what consequences can ensue from the uncontrolled flow of weapons into unstable regions where tensions run high. The chief point of the problem of the massive accumulation of conventional weapons is not only their production, but their transfer between countries as well. Therefore we agree with the views expressed here that new ideas should be developed to provide transparency in arms trade and restraint among suppliers and recipients. Lately, we noted widespread interest to conclude and implement effective arms control measures in this field. We support the proposal that the five permanent members of the Security Council, who are the principal arms exporters in the world, enter into discussions to establish guidelines on the restraint of conventional and other arms transfers.

The war in the Gulf has also demonstrated the dangers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, the spread of nuclear weapons and of ballistic missiles, the related question of arms transfers and the arms trade. Constraining the supply and availability of weapons of mass destruction, and of the materials needed for their manufacture, should be a priority task. Such constraints would substantially reduce the risks posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the ballistic missile systems that can deliver them. It is our belief that the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction and the commitment to their non-proliferation should also include missile technology.

Romania has been actively participating since the beginning of last year in the current multilateral efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. To this end, my Government expressed its readiness to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group and, as a result, last spring Romania was invited to take part in the work of this forum as a full member. In the same spirit my country decided to accept the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and to accede to this Group next autumn. We have close relations with the members of the Australia Group, working to increase the effectiveness of its control on chemical and biological materials.

In accordance with this new orientation of Romanian foreign policy, we support the latest United States Middle East arms control initiative and France's plan for global arms control and disarmament.

Romania welcomes the resumption of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the active participation in its debates. Much work is still ahead of us in order to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban regime which could be universally adhered to.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

Committed as it is to the aim of a complete test-ban treaty, Romania accepts the principle of reaching this objective gradually, in stages, on a step-by-step basis. The Romanian Government will welcome any agreement on further limitation of underground nuclear tests and any new step in this direction.

We noted with interest the considerable progress that has been made in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Romanian experts actively participate in the experiments that are presently taking place in this field. Now we received a new updated Swedish draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty so ably introduced by Ambassador Theorin. This text will have all the attention of my delegation.

We support all measures that have been agreed upon bilaterally or multilaterally to prevent the introduction of weapons and weapons systems in outer space. We appreciate the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has resumed its activity with a more targeted orientation. In the same spirit we commend the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons.

I conclude these few general remarks with the pledge that I shall do my best in order to make my share of contribution to the progress of the negotiations at the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to all the colleagues and specialists of the Conference, as well as those addressed to me and my country. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Mr. Robertson.

Mr. ROBERTSON (Canada): I would like to take the opportunity provided by this plenary to inform the representatives of both CD member States and participating non-members of a presentation that Canada will be making on Monday afternoon, 5 August, in connection with the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

Dr. Kin Yip Chun of the University of Toronto Geophysics Division has been conducting seismic research on behalf of our verification research programme. On the afternoon of Monday, 5 August, probably in room VII, he will present a layman's briefing, designed for non-experts, on certain aspects of his work, which will focus on further developments of seismic monitoring methodologies. That briefing will be immediately followed by a more detailed technical briefing for interested experts in the field of seismology who are here for the meeting of the GSE. We will also ask the secretariat to circulate a written invitation to delegations concerning Dr. Chun's presentation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for this information and we will look forward to the briefing, our attention to which he has called. With that statement we have concluded the list of those members inscribed for this morning.

(The President)

I would now take the initiative to call attention to the presence among us of the representative of India, Ambassador Chadha, who, as you know, will be leaving the Conference at the end of this month. As this is the last plenary that he will attend, I wish to convey to him on behalf of the Conference and myself our very best wishes for his future career and our most sincere appreciation for his contributions to the work of the Conference. In addition to having represented his country with distinction, Ambassador Chadha served this Conference as an elected leader and, given his well-known diplomatic skills and deep experience in multilateral organizations, it was not surprising that he discharged those responsibilities with distinction. His leadership and competence as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban are highly appreciated by all of us. Ambassador Chadha has expressed the wish to make a statement now and I therefore give him the floor.

Mr. CHADHA (India): Mr. President, may I begin by felicitating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference and by conveying to you my best wishes for a successful and fruitful term? We are confident that with your vast experience and diplomatic skills, you will be eminently successful in guiding our deliberations.

I wish to express my deep appreciation for the kind words that you have just addressed to me. It was indeed an enriching experience for me to be present during the work of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva at a time when new opportunities have been created in the field of disarmament by the far-reaching changes in East-West relations, the signature of the CFE Treaty in Europe and the announcement that the START Treaty between the United States and the USSR will be signed in the near future. We also saw a new momentum in the chemical weapons negotiations at Geneva, which may indeed lead to the completion of these negotiations in the near future.

As I approach the end of my tour of duty at Geneva, I would like to say a few words regarding my impressions of the work relating to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which, as you have just recalled, Mr. President, I had the honour to chair this year. The Ad Hoc Committee, as we are all aware, was set up after a gap of seven years for a brief period last year and was re-established this year with a non-negotiating mandate. This was made possible by the spirit of compromise shown by all. The underlying expectation was that the deliberations in the Committee would prepare the ground for the eventual conclusion of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. We proceeded with our task by identifying four major topics for discussion this year. These were taken up in two clusters, viz., (i) structure and scope, and (ii) verification and compliance. In the course of the next couple of weeks, the Committee will be further enriched by interaction with representatives of the Group of Scientific Experts. The quality of the debate was extremely high; which was indicative of the interest of delegations in the issue of a nuclear test ban. Personally, I received full cooperation from the bureau members and other delegations in the conduct of these deliberations, for which I am most grateful. It would be remiss of me not to mention the extremely competent work put in by the secretariat; and the interpreters, who had to deal with some complex terminologies.

(Mr. Chadha, India)

The exchange of views in the Committee brought out the universal recognition of the importance of the multilateral consideration of the question. The need for the Committee to be provided with a negotiating mandate continues to be underlined by most delegations. The view has also been expressed that all nuclear-weapon States must participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. While there was general acceptance of the final goal of a nuclear test ban, differences still remain on its timing and modalities. It was recognized that the achievement of a comprehensive test ban is only a partial measure in the overall goal of complete nuclear disarmament and that its importance cannot be belittled in this context. There is no doubt that a global nuclear-test-ban treaty would stem proliferation both vertically and horizontally and this would be a genuine non-proliferation measure. It was pointed out during the discussions that while a comprehensive test ban was desirable, even a one-kiloton ceiling on tests could seriously curtail the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons. This lends credence to the view that a nuclear-test-ban treaty has to be achieved quickly, lest the problems of verification become intractable. As far as verification is concerned, though there has been a widely held view that seismic methods would be adequate to detect and identify major underground nuclear explosions, it has been pointed out that an acceptable level of certainty and compliance could be achieved by looking at other methods as well, such as measurement of radiation, satellite monitoring, acoustic methods, on-site inspections and other relevant measures. The work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has been widely commended. It has been stated that the overall technical work of the Group should be seen in the political context and the guidance of the Ad Hoc Committee is essential in this respect. In this context, many delegations held the view that the GSE should be given clear and precise future tasks as quickly as possible.

The Committee also benefited from a number of concrete proposals on verification as well as on the structure of the future nuclear-test-ban treaty. The contribution of Sweden, which was made today, will further enrich the Committee's work. A nuclear test ban is more easily verifiable than most other disarmament measures. However, a decision whether or not to go ahead with the treaty would not be based only on this consideration. It would be essentially a political decision based on governmental calculations of national security and international stability. It is important that such a decision, which would help save resources needed for peaceful purposes, diminish the dangers to the environment and improve the international political climate, leading further to other disarmament measures, is taken at the earliest possible time. It is my hope that the report of the Ad Hoc Committee this year will identify specific issues for future work. It is important that delegations concentrate on a list of priorities in order to sustain an interest in this item next year and beyond. It is my experience that delegations have already shown flexibility in this regard and this should not pose insurmountable problems. I intend to hold further consultations in the course of today on this important question.

The present international situation offers adequate opportunities for the Conference on Disarmament to live up to its reputation as the single multilateral negotiating forum. The conclusion of a chemical weapons

(Mr. Chadha, India)

convention in the near future would certainly be a shot in the arm for this body. Although I have some regrets that I will not be here when this convention is finalized, I can assure you that the Indian delegation will continue to cooperate fully with other delegations at the CD in order to fulfil our important task. I wish to thank all delegations once again for their cooperation. I am also grateful to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and his able deputy, Ambassador Berasatequi, with whom I have had a long association, the other members of the secretariat for their support and encouragement, and finally wish the Conference on Disarmament well in the accomplishment of its tasks.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement, and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

If there is no other delegation wishing to take the floor, I shall proceed to other business. I see none.

The Conference has before it working paper CD/WP.408, relating to a request from Malta to participate in the work of the Conference at plenary meetings and in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I gained the impression at presidential consultations yesterday that there was no objection to that request. This being the case, I would think there is no need to hold an informal meeting to consider it, on the understanding that this does not set a precedent for the consideration of other requests. Shall I take it that the Conference agrees to the draft decision?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The Permanent Mission of Malta will be informed accordingly.

The secretariat has circulated today the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. You will notice that the seismic Group will begin its thirty-second session on Monday, at 11 a.m., in conference room VII. As we are approaching the last month of work of the Conference, I appeal to all members to be available to start our meetings on time, so that we can fully utilize the resources available to us. This applies in particular to those meetings being held consecutively, and thus the utmost punctuality is required. Of course, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. On this understanding, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the informal paper.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today, but before adjourning this plenary meeting, I wish to remind you all that the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", immediately following this. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 1 August, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.